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ABSTRACT

This paper is concerned with the Arab League and its role in the
Arab world.

Its primary concern is with Arab unity, the Palestine

problem, Arab disputes, and cooperation among Arab states.
Since the establishment of the League in 1945 as an organization
through which the various Arab states could work together by voluntary
cooperation in all spheres, and as a means toward achievement of Arab
unity, many important developments in the Arab world, both in the internal
and external fields took place, and led to instability in the Arab world.
The political and social revolutions in the Arab world have led to
power struggles and divisions among Arab leaders, and created inter-Arab
rivalries and disputes.

Because of these the League's activities have

been adversely affected, and the League has been unable to achieve the
goals for which it was created.
The League, since its birth in 1945, has not succeeded in saving
its members from the loss of Palestine, or from the internal intrigues,
or from the Baghdad Pact, or from tensions between its members.

It

showed its impotence in the Arab world for its inability to play politi
cally any useful role in time of crisis.
Despite its ineffectiveness politically, due to political divisions
among its members as well as the turbulent conditions prevailing in the
Arab world, the League has nevertheless been effective to some extent in

v

cultural and economic measures as the league has obtained the commitments
of its members for increased cooperation.

And, the League will continue

to function voluntarily as long as the Arab leaders are willing to
cooperate.

It will continue to focus on the common hostility of its

member states toward Israel as it has frequently gone on record with
expression of its rejection of the legitimacy of the state of Israel and
with calls for a return of the Palestinian refugees to their former
homes, and it will continue to reflect the balance among Arab governments
and the prevailing opinions in the Arab world no matter how conditions
change.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Arabs
The Arabs, an ancient people, who claim and trace their ancestry to
the Patriarch Abraham through his firstborn son Ismael, whose mother was
an Agyptian, crossed Africa at some unknown time and mixed their blood
with Hamitic people.

Descendants of the Arabs have included the Phoen

icians, the Canaanites, the Assyrians, the Babylonians, and the Hebrews,
as well as other tribal groups.
Through many centuries, the Arabs were chiefly nomads, leading
flocks and herds from pasture to pasture; later, they dwelt and settled
in communities in southwest Arabia, in the land called Yemen.

About

3500 B.C. some of the Arabs migrated northeastward into the TigrisEurophrates Valley, while others pushed along the Red Sea coast into Syria
and Palestine.

"Their descendants had lived in Palestine for 2000 years

before Moses led the Hebrew tribes through Sinai to the banks of
Jordan.
In the year 570 A.D., the Arabic Prophet Muhammad was born in Mecca,
Arabia.

About 613 A.D., he began preaching a new religion called Islam,

proclaiming it as a religion for all men everywhere, and abolishing and

^"Anthony Nutting, The Arabs:
Clarkson N. Potter, 1964), p. 13.

A Narrative History (New York:

1

2

ignoring all ethnic distinctions or territorial boundaries in the name of
Allah, "God".

Islam grew, and spread, fast and it became a political as

well as spiritual realm.
Muhammad led the Arabs in spreading Islam among neighboring nations.
He died in 632, but his successors, the Caliphs, continued iiis campaign
and succeeded in forming an Arab Empire.

Their armies swept through

Persia and northern India, reaching iixto Russia and China and the Islands
of the Indian Ocean.

Arab armies drove the Byzantines out of Syria,

Palestine and Turkey; other armies advanced into Africa from Egypt to
Morocco and Mauritania.

They advanced through the Balkans, seized Sicily,

occupied' Iberia, and pushed into France where they were "Stopped at Tours
in 732 by Charles Martel.
The Arabs built an Arab Empire with armies chiefly made up of Arabs,
and created an Arab Empire anchored on Arab lands.

This empire covered

southwest Asia, all of northern Africa, and much of southern Europe, and
was the largest, strongest, and most advanced empire that earth had yet
known.
In the 16th Century, the Arab nation came under the domination of the
Ottomans.

As the Ottoman Empire in turn declined in the 19th Century,

Western imperialistic powers entered the scene, and the Arab land became
a tempting target for Western empire builders mainly because of its
strategic location and because of its natural resources.

"During the

nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, the ARab countries fell under

■^Philip K. Ilitti, History of the Arabs (London:
Ltd., 1973), p. 215.

The Macmillan Press

3

European domination in rapid succession,Algeria in 1830, Tunisia in 1881,
Egypt in 1882, the Sudan in 1898, Morocco in 1970-1912, Libya in 1911,
Iraq, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria in 1918.
Through all the ages of recorded history, the empires of this
earth have fought to hold and control the Arab world; they seized these
territories and ruled briefly over them.

Nevertheless, through all these

experiences, the Arabs remained Arabs.
Today, the Arab world stretches more than 4000 miles, from Iraq and
Bahrain in the Arabian Gulf across southwestern Asia to the Mediterranean.
"It spans the continent of Africa from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic
and probes the borders to Kenya and Mali.

These vast territories are all

Arabs ethnically, culturally, and historically."^

Within that region (5

million square miles) in the very center of the world, live more than a
hundred million people who call themselves Arabs, speak the Arab language,
claim an Arab heritage, and share in the Arab aspirations.

Arab Nationalism
Since the turn of this century, the forces of Arab nationalism have
been shaping the destinies of the Arab countries in a great variety of
ways.

At the outbreak of World War I, the Arabs aspired to rid themselves

of Turkish rule, and to accomplish that, they declared the revolt in the
Hijaz against the Ottomans, and joined the forces of the Allies in the

^Fayz, A. Sayegh, The Dynamics of Neutralism in the Arab World (San
Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1964), p. 114.
“^Eugene M. Fisher, Storm Over the Arab World (Chicago:
Publishing Co., 1972), p. 1.

Follett
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war.

They believed that they were Arabs because they spoke Arabic, a

language different from Turkish, entitling themselves to secede from the
Ottoman Empire, and to form an Arab state in which everyone who spoke
Arabic would be included.

But, at the end of the war, the Arabs were

rewarded by the division of their lands "by the victorious Allies and
their imposition of 'artificial' boundaries"^ in the Arab world.

The

Arabs denounced the Western imperialist designs and dismemberment of the
Arab nation, and called the boundaries drawn up at the peace conference
of January 31, 1919, in Paris, arbitrary and artificial.

In the years

following World War I "Pan-Arabism was the only political doctrine to
make headway and to exert a powerful appeal in the Arab-Speaking lands."6
On July, 1919, the General Syrian congress made up of Arab
representatives from Syria, Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan, was held in
Damascus; its representatives produced a memorandum presented to the King
Krane Commission,'7 in which they protested "against Article 22 of the
Covenant of the League of Nations for placing them under the League
mandate,"8 called for the complete political independence of the Arab
countries, rejected British and French rule in Greater Syria, opposed the

^Henry Siegman, "Arab Unity and Disunity," The Middle East Journal,
XVI (Winter, 1962), p. 73.
^Elie Kedourie, The Chatham House Version and Other Middle Eastern
Studies (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1970), p. 213.
^The American Section of the International Commission which was
sent by the League of Nations to Syria for study and recommendations in
concern to placing Syria, Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan under the
League mandate.
O
°Muhammad Kahlil, The Arab States and the Arab League (Beirut:
Khayats, 1962), Vol. II, p. 3.
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pretentions of the Zionists to create a Jewish commonwealth in the
southern part of Syria, known as Palestine, and asked for a unification
under a democratic constitutional monarchy to be headed by a King, "the
king to be is Amir Faisal the son of Sherif Hussein Ben Ali, who had
carried on a glorious struggle in the cause of Arab liberation, and
fought courageously on the side of the Allies for three years."9
As the League of Nations mandate agreement of 1919 [in which rto
Arab state or representative participated] became certain, Arab nation
alists felt compelled to fight the mandate administrations of Britain and
France; they pledged to expell the alien occupation powers.

The Arabs

protested and demonstrated, several strikes were proclaimed, and later
the Arab leaders called for an armed rebellion which broke out in 1920;
and ever since Arab warfare has continued sporadically.
On December 13, 1931, an Arab National Congress was held in
Jerusalem.

Delegates vowed that "the efforts of all the Arab countries

shall be directed towards one objective, namely their complete indepen
dence and unity, and the combating of every idea which aims at restricting
(Arab) efforts to local and provincial policies."^®
Between the wars, and after the outbreak of the Second World War,
Arab efforts were bent on securing (by war) an independence for Syria
and Lebanon from France, the curtailment or suppression of the Zionists

^Fred J. Khouri, The Arab-Israeli Dilemma (Syracuse:
University Press, 1968), p. 16.

Syracuse

■'^Muhammed I. Darwaza, Hawl Al-IIaraka Al-Arabiyya Al-Haditha
[Concerning the Modern Arab Movement] (Sidon, Lebanon: National Press,
1951), Vol. Ill, p. 302.
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activities in Palestine, and the establishment of a unitary or federal
Arab state embracing the Fertile Crescent.

This was the original Pan-

Arab Programme, on which the original Pan-Arabs had always set their
hearts.
"The Pan-Arabs desired the unification of the Arab lands; they
desired to expel the foreigner.

To them the political unity of the

Arab world was considered a natural condition, and the present state of
fragmentation has been attributed to outside forces, and so, "unity is
the basic underlying form in the life of the Arab Peoples; their divisions
into separate entities is a transient phase of recent intrusion."12

They

believed that inside the Arab world, no natural barriers shut the Peoples
off from one another to make any man less Arab than another; while
linking their memories to past glories, they recalled a golden age of Arab
greatness which is held to be true of the Arab past.

Thus, Arabism and

Pan-Arabism ideas associated with racial, linguistic, and cultural unity,
which contributed chiefly to the development and the spread of the
nationalistic movement, proposing a union of all Arab states.
In the summer of 1940, Rashid Ali-Al-Kailani was engaged in a
conspiracy to take power in Iraq and align it with the Axis states.H

He.

sent an emissary to Turkey who presented to Von Papen, the German
ambassador, a list of demands which included "the confirmation by the1
2

11Ibid., p. 219.

12Nejla Izzeddin, The Arab World, Past, Present and Future (Chicago:
Henry Regnery Co, 1953), p. 314.
1 O

JHe took power on April 3, 1941 as he was asked by the Iraqi army to
head the Government of National Defense which overthrew the monarchy.
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Axis of the independence of all Arab countries, the abolition of the
Jewish National Home declared by Britain, and the recognition of Arab
unity.From

that time forward the idea of Arab nationalism and Arab

unity has had an especially powerful hold on the imaginations of all Arab
people.

The League of Arab States
During the early years of World War II, the British government was
determined to gain the support of the Arab leaders in Syria, Lebanon,
and Iraq, by lending them its support for some form of regional amalgam
ation.

British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden announced the new British

policy towards the Arab countries on May 29, 1941.

"The Arab world has

made great strides since the settlement reached at the end of the last
war, and many Arab thinkers desire for the Arab peoples a greater degree
of unity than they now enjoy.
hope for our support.
unanswered.

In reaching out toward this unity, they

No such appeal from our friends should go

It seems to me both natural and right that the cultural and

economic ties between the Arab countries, and the political ties too,
should be strengthened.

His majesty's government for their part will

give their full support to any scheme that commands general approval."15
This statement suggested to the Arab leaders that Britain intended to drop
its policy of divide-and-rule in the Arab world, and that would be a good
chance for the establishment of Arab unity.

^Al-Irfan (Sidon, Lebanon), August, 1951, p. 8.
-^George Kirk, The Middle East in the War (London:
sity Press, 1953), p. 334.

Oxford Univer
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In March, 1943, Nuri Al-Said, the Prime Minister of Iraq, "circu
lated his 'Blue Book' which suggested the 'reuniting' of Syria, Lebanon,
Palestine, and Transjordan into one state (Syria) and the formation of an
Arab League to include any Arab states which might desire to join."-*-6
On August 24, 1943, Amir Abdullah of Transjordan addressed a letter
to his Prime Minister, Tawfig Abu Al-Huda, concerning the question of
Arab unity.

In his letter he proposed the "Greater Syria" plan as he

visualized "the unification of his emirate with Arab Palestine, Syria, •
Lebanon, and possibly Iraq under his leadership."^7

However, both men

were distrusted and unpopular within the Arab world, not only because of
their personal ambitions but also because of their continued connection
with the British who were mastering the creation of a Zionist state in
Palestine by authorizing the Jewish immigration to Palestine and by
regulating the transfer of Arab-owned land to Zionist control.
After differing reactions to and opinions of Nuri Al-Said’s Fertile
Crescent Project and Abdullah's Greater Syria Plan by the leaders of the
other Arab countries, Egypt's Prime Minister, Nahhas Pasha, announced on
July 23, 1944 that he was inviting the Arab states "to a Joint Conference
in Cairo to consider actions leading to talks on Arab Unity.

-^Sydney N. Fisher, The Middle East:
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1969), p. 630.

A History (New York:

-^King Abdullah, Muthukkarat Al-Malllc Abdullah [King Abdullah
Memoirs] (Amman, Jordan: An-Nahda Press, 1955), p. 241.
I O

Philip Ireland, "The Pact of the League of Arab States,"
American Journal of International Law, XXXIX (October 1945).

9

When the conference convened on September 25, 1944, at Alexandria
instead of Cairo, participating delegations came from Lebanon, Egypt,
Iraq, Syria and Transjordan; observers were sent by Saudi Arabia, Yemen,
Libya, Morocco and Palestine.

From September 25 to October 7, 1944 the

participants struggled with the problem of an appropriate structural
organization.

Three forms of political organization were debated;

1.

Unitary state xtfith central political authority;

2.

Federated state with a central parliament of executive committee
with full political power over federal issues;

3.

A loose confederation with emphasis on coordination and coop
eration .-*-9

After bitter debate and much hesitation, the third form was
selected and approved by common agreement; provided for were six committees
concerned respectively with political, social, economic, health, cultural,
and communications problems.
The draft agreement establishing the League of Arab States was
signed on October 7, 1944 by delegates from Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and
Transjordan.20

"The Saudi and Yemeni representatives referred the

protocol to their governments,"21 and observers from other Arab countries
expressed their hope for eventual affiliation.*
0
2

■*^Foda Ezzeldin, The Projected' Arab Court of Justice (The Hague,
Holland: Martinius Nijhoff, 1957), p. 6-7.
20

See Appendix A.

^Al-Ahram (Cairo), October 8, 1944, p. 1.
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During February and March 1945, a committee of Arab foreign
ministers and experts met in Cairo to draft the constitution of the
League of Arab States.

On March 7 a General Arab Congress convened in

Cairo to review and draft a pact known as the "Alexandria Protocol,"22
which was signed March 22, by six of the seven founding members, Egypt,
Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Transjordan.

A copy of the pact

was sent to the Imam of Yemen, who signed it on May 10, and the pact, the
O O

Covenant of the League of Arab States, came into effect on May 11.
The Pact of the League of Arab States (now generally called simply
the Arab League) provided for a permanent seat in Cairo, including a
Council and a permanent secretariat headed by a Secretary-General, a
political committee, and various functional committees.

It also stip

ulated that the objective of the Arab League was close cooperation between
member states in matters concerning economic and financial affairs,
communications, cultural affairs, problems of nationality, social affairs
and health.

Membership is restricted to independent Arab States who

wish to join, and are willing to assume an obligation to support the
League financially on a prorated basis to be determined from time to time
by the League’s Council.

22gee Appendix B.
^Ratifications were as follows:
Transjordan
March 31, 1945
Iraq
April 1, 1945
Syria
April 3, 1945
Egypt
April 15, 1945
Lebanon
April 7, 1945
Saudi Arabia
April 7, 1945
Yemen
May 11, 1945
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The Arab League Council composed of all members of the organization,
is made up of representatives from the member states (each having one
vote regardless of the number of representatives it sends to the Council)
and a representative from Palestine, meeting twice a year (now in March
and September) in regular sessions at Cairo.

Sessions may be held else

where at the option of the Council.
The principal function of the council is to supervise the execution
of agreements concluded between the League members, to mediate disputes
between members or between members and non-members, and to coordinate
defense measures in the event of an attack or threat of aggression against
members.

Also it has internal legislative functions including the

preparation and approval of administrative regulations for the Council,
the technical committees and the secretariat, and regulations of certain
matters including the approval of the budget.

The appointment of the

Secretary-General, confirmation of the Secretary-General and approval
of amendments to the Pact require a two-thirds majority, other admin
istrative actions require only a simple majority.
The League's Council is the legal decision making body which
ratifies decisions recommended by the political committee.

Voting

procedures for the Council are established by the League's Pact and are
enumerated for various situations.

Members of the Council have no direct

veto power; a member can refuse to implement decisions approved by the
membership, but cannot block an action . ^

The chairmanship of the Council

is rotated among the member states in alphabetical order.

^ S e e Appendix B, Articles 4 and 6.
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The Arab League Secretariat, given only administrative and executive
functions by the Pact, assumed an important role in the decision making
process from the beginning.

It is headed by a Secretary-General in the

rank of ambassador, elected for a five year term whose office includes
four supervisors (Mushrifin), experts in the fields of cultural affairs,
economics, public health, and social affairs.

The new secretariat

building in Cairo was dedicated on March 22, 1960, the fifteenth anniver
sary of the Arab League.

CHAPTER II

ARAB MONARCHS AND PRESIDENTS
The destruction of the Ottoman Empire by the Allies in World War I
resulted in British and French control over the Arab world, creating some
Arab kingdoms and dependent states ruled by allies to the west; since
I

then rivalries, disputes, hatred, and mistrust have existed in the Arab
world.
At the beginning of World War I, Britain had promised the creation
of an independent Arab Kingdom in southwest Asia in return for Arab help
against Turkey.

It offered its plan to Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, who turned

it down as he was building a kingdom of his own.

Then, the plan was

offered to the Hashemite Hussein Ben Ali, the Sherif of Mecca, who
accepted it and raised the banner of the Arab Revolt against the Turks
in 1915, believing in, and dreaming of, his expected postwar kingdom
which would be ruled by his sons and would include all of Mesapotamia,
part of what is now Saudi Arabia, Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon.
As World War I ended, with the Allies victorious, Ibn Saud feared
the creation of the projected Hashemite Kingdom, and in 1924, the Saudi
armies attacked the Hashemites at Zuraba in Hijaz, pushing forward to
the frontiers of Jordan, destroying the Hashemites power and expelling
them from Arabia.

Since that time, dynastic rivalries have existed

between the Hashemites of Jordan and Iraq and the house of Saud.

13
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When in 1944 and 1945, the League of Arab States was being orga
nized, Ibn Saud refused to sign the League's Pact as his attitude towards
Arab "unity and brotherhood" took a different turn.

His fear of a strong

Hashemite bloc within the League, his apprehension of interference in
Saudi Arabia's affairs, and reluctance to share the oil revenues with any
one else made him extremely cold to close unity among the seven now
independent Arab countries.

Finally, Ibn Saud consented to sign the

League pact only after the introduction of an amendment to the text which
emphasized the "Independence and Sovereignty" of the member states and
the addition of a provision which stated that "every member state . . .
shall respect the form of government obtaining in other states . . . and
recognize (it) as one of the rights of those states . . . and pledge
itself not to take any action tending to change that form."-*Since the establishment of the League in 1945, Arab leaders car
ried their interests and traditional rivalries into the League.

The

conflict between the interests of the Hashemite Kingdoms of Jordan and
Iraq on one side, and the Egyptian-Saudi interests on the other developed
a balance of power system within the League, and led to the formation of
blocs within the system, dominating the League's affairs.
The creation of the state of Israel in Arab Palestine in 1948
resulted in sharp differences of opinion among the Arab governments and
nationalists, between those who saw Western imperialism as a major threat
to Arab independence, and those who believed that friendship and coopera
tion with the West would bring a satisfactory solution to the Palestine
problem.

•*-See Appendix B, Articles 2 and 8.
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After the rise of President Nasser of Egypt in s:

1950's, Arab

leaders virtually split into two streams as far as Are: Nationalism and
Arab hostility to Israel were concerned.

"Those who favored cooperation

with the West against Russia in the belief that this would bring some
Western cooperation over Israel"^ were led by Iraq's Prime Minister, Nuri
Al-Said, followed by the reactionary rulers of Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi
Arabia, Morocco, and Tunisia, and those revolutionaries who opposed
the West were led by Egypt and Syria.
In 1953 the United States had decided on military aid to Iraq, and
an exchange of notes on April 21, 1954 concerning the formulation of a
regional defense alliance and the Baghdad Pact was made.

It was under

stood between the two governments that Iraq would play its part in
regional defense.
This action by Iraq raised the whole question of relations with the
other Arab States and the possible breaking of the solidarity of the Arab
League.

The Arabs themselves had tried to meet the problems of regional

defense by ratifying the Arab Collective Security Pact, known as the Arab
Joint Defense Council, which came into force on April 13, 1952, under
which the members pledged to consult in times of danger, to coordinate
their armed forces and resources, and to aid without delay any member
subjected to aggression.3
In August 1954 Nasser had sent Major Salah Salem to dissuade
Nuri and Iraqi leaders from acting independently of the League.

^Charles D. Home, The Arabs and Israel (London:
Ltd., 1970), p. 67.

The

The Bodley Head

^Mathew A. Fitzsimons, Empire by Treaty (Notre Dame, Indiana:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1964), p. 124.
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following month, "Nuri went to Cairo and vainly sought to persuade Nasser
of the desirability of broadening the Arab League Collective Security Pact
by including Pakistan, Turkey, Britain, and the United States.'"^
At Cairo in December 1954, a meeting of the foreign ministers of
the member states of the Arab League Collective Security Council made
an effort to settle differences and agreed on the necessity of strengthen
ing the Pact and developing a military organization to assume responsi
bility for the Arab Middle Eastern defense.

But, in casting their votes

for Arab unity of defense, Egypt and Iraq were working from separate
corners.

Accordingly, on February 24, 1955, the regional pact was signed

at Baghdad, Turkey and Iraq pledged cooperation.
The signing of the Baghdad Pact by Iraq led to a violent outburst
from Egypt, which accused Iraq of having betrayed the quest for Arab unity,
and "in rispote Egypt sought compensatory stronger ties with Syria and
Saudi Arabia, and for a time with J o r d a n . T o Nasser and his followers,
the "Baghdad Pact disrupted the common front of the Arab League against
I s r a e l . B e c a u s e of Arab Nationalist opposition to the Pact, it
contributed largely to the destruction of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958.
"It disrupted the Arab League, and pushed the Arab Nationalists into work
ing arrangements with Russia which brought Communist influence into the
Arab world; the one thing the Pact was meant to prevent.

^See Appendix C,
5Zeev Sharef, Three Days (Garden City, New York:
1962), p. 72.

Doubleday, Inc.,

^George A. Lanyi, Crisis and Continuity in World Politics (New York:
Random House, Inc., 1966), p. 624.
^G. H. Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment (London:
Faber Ltd., 1966), p. 137.

Faber and
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The Baghdad Pact broke the solidarity of the Arab League, and it
seemed that Egypt would break up the League by insisting on Iraq's expul
sion or by withdrawing itself.

But, the League survived because neither

rival wished to take the responsibility for its breakup.
Although the rulers of the Arab republics, kingdoms and sheikhdoms
have reasons for maintaining ties with Eastern and Western powers, most
agree on the dangers of involvement with the great powers, and the neces
sity of maintaining Arab solidarity against their interference.
The 1956 British-French-Israeli invasion of Egypt evoked resent
ment throughout the Arab world.

It was felt among the Arabs that the

attack was directed not against Egypt alone but against all Arabs, and
specifically against Arab nationalism.

Consequently, the conservative

Arab leaders stood firmly behind Egypt in its resistance to the attack
because any show of open alignment with the West would have made their own
domestic power and authority less stable.

Lebanon was an exception; it

failed to give any active support to Egypt and, the government refused to
sever diplomatic relations with Great Britain and France.
After the Suez War, of 1956, the Arab revolutionaries saw Western
imperialism as the major threat to their independence, they felt that they
ought to rid themselves of any Western influence or control.

As the revo

lution spread, however, a growing mutuality of interests tended to draw
the revolutionary governments into one bloc, and drive the foes of the
revolution into another, thus, the fear of revolution dictated most of
the decisions and actions of the Arab rulers.
The birth of the United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria on
February 21, 1958, called for an Arab unity throughout the Arab world,

18

and led to the merger of Iraq and Jordan into the short lived Arab Federa
tion, which was destroyed by the overthrow of the Iraqi pro-western
government.

Subsequently, "the Arab States fell into a number of dif

ferent and conflicting alignments, although all still proclaimed loyalty
to the Arab League and its Collective Security Pact of 1950.
Since the establishment of the United Arab Republic in 1958,
several attempts for unity were proclaimed.

But, the growing potential

for conflicts among national and ideological interests, and among the rich
states and poor states, hindered the course of unity, and made the Arab
world a breeding place of subversion, assassination, and local wars.
In January 1958, King Saud tried to prevent the Egyptian-Syrian merger,
and his attempt not only failed, but also resulted in a political crisis
that almost cost him his throne.

And with the coming of Faisal to power,

Saudi Arabian policy reverted to the basic lines drawn by former King
Ibn Saud, "cautious friendship with Egypt and other Arab states, little
involvement in Arab affairs, and correct relations with the Western
powers.
In the autumn of 1961, after the secession of Syria from the United
Arab Republic, President Nasser of Egypt had decided to build his policy
on the foundation of revolutionary ideology so as to stimulate the Arab
world towards Arab unity, and also, to create internal pressure on his
rivals.

And for that purpose he saw in the Yemeni revolution of 1962 a*
9

^John c. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East (New York:
Brothers Co., 1958), p. 207.

Harper

9
Hisham B. Sharabi, Governments and Politics of the Middle East
in the Twentieth Century (Princeton:
D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc.,
1962), p. 241.
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golden opportunity.

His array intervened as the champion of the revolu

tionary progress, while "Saudi Arabia and Jordan felt compelled to support
the royalists out of dynastic solidarity, and were looked upon by their
people as ultra-reactionary. "-*-^
In February 1963, Morocco's king, fearing the power and influence
of Nasser, tried to create a federation or league of the Maghreb (North
west Africa) States to offset the Egyptian influence in the Arab world,
and called for a conference at Casablanca.

Ben Bella of Algeria scorned

such scheme calling it a "Casablanca Bloc," and argued that it "would be
a tool in the hands of Western imperialists against Arab unity; common
aims and needs," he said, "must be the only criteria of inter-Arab
relations. "■*-■*•
At the end of 1963, the Arab States were on unsatisfactory terms
with each other.
with Iraq.

Syria was feuding with Egypt, and after November, 1963

Egypt and Saudi Arabia were engaged in a struggle for the

future of Yemen, where 40,000 Egyptian troops had failed to win a final
victory for the revolution there,

Algeria had come to clashes with

Morocco over a border dispute and had another dispute with Tunisia.
Tunisia and Morocco severed terms after Tunisia recognized the indepen
dence of Mauritania which was acquired by Morocco.

Egypt was hostile

to Jordan as well as Saudi Arabia, and took the side of revolutionary
Algeria against her conservative neighbors Morocco and Tunisia.

^Nutting, The Arabs:

Syria1

A Narrative History, p. 217.

11

A 1-Ahram (Cairo), February 23, 1953, p. 1.
/
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was unfriendly to Morocco, Jordan and Lebanon.

"Of the thirteen member

states of the Arab League, only three were on satisfactory terms with
everyone:

Kuwait, the Sudan, and Libya."12

In spite of their hatred and distrust of each other and exchanges
of insults through the press, the Kings and Presidents of the Arab states
often gathered for a summit meeting of the Arab League, kissing, embrac
ing, and shaking hands in an atmosphere of brotherhood, re-establishing
friendship and settling all differences within few hours in the spirit of
the Arab League for the sake of Palestine and Arab unity.

In 1963,

when the Israeli Chief of Staff declared that Israel would divert the waters
of the Jordan River against the will of the Arabs, Nasser asked for a
meeting of the Arab Kings and Heads of States to take place as soon as
possible, regardless of the strifes and conflicts between them.

"Those

with whom we are in strife, we are prepared to meet, those with whom
we have a quarrel, we are ready for the sake of Palestine, to sit with."-^
On December 17, 1964, the Cairo weekly magazine, Rose Al-Yusuf published
an article containing two principal points
diversion.

The first was

concerning the Jordan River

that "the UnitedArab Republic will not let

itself be pushed into a battle with Israel
unity among all the Arab countries."

before the attainment of

The second point which seemed to

contradict the first, was that "the UAR know how and when it will eli
minate Israel, and it knows itself to be capable of shouldering this

^ Al-Usbua Al-Arabi [The Arab Week]

(Beirut), February 18, 1964,

p. 37.
^carnal Abdel Nasser, Khitabat Carnal Abdel Nasser [Gamal Abdel
Nasser Speeches] (Cairo: National Press House, 1972), p. 651.
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burden by itself.

It seemed that on certain goals the Arab leaders

were largely united, but, their individualistic nature reflected the
means by which their goals might be attained.
At the beginning of 1967 one of the issues that divided the Arab
world was the Civil War in Yemen.

Egypt had sent an army there to defend

the Yemen's republic against royalists, Jordanian and Saudi Arabian
attacks.

King Hussein and King Faisal believed that without Egyptian

military help the revolutionary regime at San'a would quickly collapse.
Because of that, by March 1967, Jordan and Saudi Arabia were boycotting
the meetings of the Arab League's Defense Council, and "demands [by
Egypt and Syria] had been raised for their expulsion from the League mem
bership."-*^

Many members of the League, including Libya, Sudan,

Lebanon, Kuwait, and to an extent Iraq, were clearly distressed at the
sharp ideological cleavage [concerning the Yemen War] between Egypt,
Syria, Yemen, and Jordan-Saudi Arabia alliances, believing that the
cleavage could only cause them harm.

They preferred to maintain good

relations with everyone, and disliked being pressed to take sides.
Despite their disputes and political differences, there are certain
great issues which automatically bind the Arabs together:

"Their mutual

interest in freedom from great-power interference; their common experience
in winning independence, and shared fears of attempts to abrogate it; the
Sacred cause of Arab lands not yet free of foreign rule."Ik

The Arabs

l^Rose Al-Yusuf (Cairo), December 17, 1964, p. 28.
■^Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War 1958-1967
University Press, 1967), p. 167.

(New York:

^Charles D. Cremeans, The Arabs and The World (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1963), p. 12.

Oxford
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manifested such bonds during the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, as all the
Arab States went to the aid of Egypt, Jordan and Syria; and for the first
time the Arabs used their oil as a weapon against the West.

Iraq and

Kuwait stopped oil deliveries to the West, but Saudi Arabia and Libya
refused to do likewise.

Again the Arabs manifested such bonds in the

Arab-Israeli War in October, 1973, as all were solidly united behind an
oil embargo.
One of the most important features of the Arab-Israeli October War
of 1973 was the new pattern of Arab solidarity manifested.

Iraq sent very

substantial forces to the front, as it did in 1967, only this time they
took an active part in the fighting.

Kuwait and Saudi Arabia contributed

vast amounts to the War chest while Libya contributed money as well as
Mirage fighter planes acquired from France.

In addition, the three

Maghreb countries contributed small contingents.
Saudi Arabia took the lead in putting the Arab "oil weapon" into
play, by placing a total embargo on oil shipments to the United States,
Holland, and Britain for their sympathy and collaboration over Israel.
The other oil producers followed its lead.

Countries like Saudi Arabia,

Kuwait and Iraq could feel completely safe from any Israeli threat.
Whatever contribution they made to the Arab cause against Israel was
made purely on the grounds of Pan-Arab considerations.

CHAPTER III

ARAB UNITY AND DISUNITY
The move towards an Arab unity was inspired by the national feeling
which had been subdued in the Arab world through centuries of foreign
domination and divisive influence.
Since the creation of the state of Israel in Arab Palestine in 1948,
the idea of such unity has had a powerful hold on imaginations of the
Arab people, and "no Arab leader is strong enough to ignore its appeal."1
Each leader justifies himself in terms of his devotion to this ideal, and
accuses his opponents of its betrayal.

Many academic and diplomatic ob

servers have noted that "the presence of Israel in the Middle East
has contributed largely to the movement of Arab unity.",2 and that the
unity of all Arabs and the restoration of Palestine has become the goal
as well as the dream of the Arab nation and Arab nationalists.
The leaders of Arab nationalism were also the leaders of the Arab
revolution, and their drive for Arab unity demanded an end to all Arab
dependence on and relief from foreign control.
of the Arab world into two camps developed.

And thus, the division

Those aligned with the West

opposed both Arab nationalism and the revolution, and the revolutionaries
who carried on the struggle to mobilize the popular masses in order to

^Siegman, Arab Unity and Disunity, p. 81.
^Jacob C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension
New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1969), p. 377.
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effect radical transformation of the Arab society.

As the revolution

spread, the Arab world became engulfed in different disputes and border
clashes, creating a divergence between nationalism and national interests,
and hindering the achievement of Arab unity and the restoration of
Palestine.
Arab defeat in Palestine and in the Suez War of 1956, strengthened
the belief among Arab nationalists that unity would provide the strength
they needed to liberate the Arab world and to put an end to the
Palestine problem.

To accomplish it they engaged in a series of military

revolutions and in several attempts for unity, such as the merger on
February 21, 1958 of Egypt and Syria into the UAR joined later by Yemen,
and also the creation of the Arab Federation of Iraq and Jordan formed on
March 19, 1958.

But both attempts failed because of the clash between

nationalism and national interests.

Syria justified its secession with

the argument that it wasn't ready to accept Nasser's Arab Socialism, and
naturally King Hussein had no wish to be united with a revolutionary
Iraqi regime which destroyed his federation and endangered his throne.
The secession of Syria from the United Arab Republic dramatized
the basic ideological differences between Syria and Egypt, and it led to
a new Arab power struggle in the Arab world.

Although Nasser emphasized

the "demand for a single nationalist front in each country representing
all views as a prerequisite for unity,"3 Nasser's demands were impossible
to achieve in the Arab world, as the Arabs first had to overcome the
social and economic backwardness which plagued the Arab countries.

^Alfred M. Lilienthal, The Other Side of the Coin (New York:
Devin Adair Co., 1965), p. 260.

The
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Also, it seemed unlikely that Egypt would consider federation with a
state which had not embarked on a social and economic revolution similar
to that taking place in Egypt.
In 1961, President Abdel-Karim Kassem of Iraq claimed sovereignty
over the oil-rich Sheikhdom of Kuwait.

However, Kuwait was under

British control and Britain did not propose to give it up.
rivalries came into play, too.

Various Arab

Neither Saudi Arabia nor Egypt wanted to

see Iraq in Kuwait, and consequently they were determined to block the
Iraqi ambitions by sending their troops (under the Arab League command)
for the defense of Kuwait.

To Arab nationalists, this action by Iraq,

Egypt, and Saudi Arabia "dramatized that the major obstacle to Arab unity
was no longer foreign influence but, disagreement among the Arabs them
selves .
As the military capabilities of Israel multiplied after the ArabIsraeli War of 1967, and as Israel demonstrated such great capacity to
hurt the Arabs in the previous Arab-Israeli wars, several Arab states
felt the danger of such power directly and again they preached for Arab
unity.
On November 8, 1970, the rulers of Sudan, Egypt, and Libya
announced a plan for an Arab Socialist Federation of their states which
would permit a unified action on essential Arab problems within a
revolutionary framework, while leaving each state free to handle internal
issues on its own terms5--Syria asked to join.

But, on April 17, 1971,

^Manfred Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle
East and North Africa (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963),
p. 372.
^Al-Ahram (Cairo), November 9, 1970, p. 1.
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the Sudanese government announced that it would not enter the proposed
federation.

Internal opposition led by the Communist Party had forced

President General Jaafar Al-Numeiry and his ministers to reconsider
their decision.

And in June 1971 Sudan withdrew but promised active

collaboration in the federation program.
On August 2, 1973, an attempt was made by Libya's Muammar Quaddaffi
for a merger with Egypt.

But, on September 1, 1973, Egypt's Arab

Socialist Union Party declined to approve such a merger because of
Egyptian opposition to

Quaddaffi's Islamic ideologies.

In January

1974, another attempt was made by Quaddaffi to merge Libya and Tunisia in
an Arab Federation; again, Quaddaffi's attempt failed to gain the approval
of the Tunisian people.

It is clear that there are still many obstacles

lying in the path of Ai'ab unity; localism and nationalism, social and
economic backwardness, all hinder progress towards the ideal of Arab
unity, and because of that, the prospects of Fertile Crescent union have
been dim.

Also, they account for the failure of union between Egypt and

Syria, and made the rest of the Arab states unready to accept the
uncertainties of union with each other.
Despite the failure of the many attempts at Arab unity "no Arab
leader, public figure, or private citizen who wishes to retain his stand
ing and influence with other Arabs would criticize the ideal of Arab
unity or suggest that it will not eventually, in some form or another,
come to p a s s . M o s t opponents of Arab union do not oppose unity, but
they argue that a complete merger in one superstate is of no advantage to

^Cremeans, The Arabs and The World, p. 58.
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the ordinary Arab.

Furthermore, when a plan for unity posed the question

of where power ultimate should reside, the countries could not easily
agree.
On March 14, 1963, in an address to the Syrian and Iraqi delegation
in Cairo, President Nasser criticized the Arab leaders for their insincere
efforts toward Arab unity; "we are," he told them, "really suffering
from a complex about union because of too much talk."^

And in a 1964

interview with the Observer, Nasser said significantly that "the real
meaning of Arab unity is unity of action in the face of danger; Arabs
must work together.

Constitutional unity is different and will be

difficult to achieve.
After President Nasser's death, most Arab intellectuals and regimes
preferred to work out their own ideology by "mixing nationalism with
socialism, each in its own way."^

Egypt's President Sadat, himself,

called for a new society to be built on "science and faith."
In December 1972, Quaddaffi of Libya maintained in a public rally
that "only Arab unity could give the power, the strength, and the means
to the Arabs to defeat Isi'ael and imperialism."

A few days later

President Habib Bourgiba of Tunisia replied that "unity of two under
developed states cannot lead to strength.

^Al-Ahram (Cairo), March 15, 1963, p. 3.
^The Observer (London), July 5, 1964, p. 5.
^Arnold Ilottinger, "The Depth of Arab Radicalism," Foreign
Affairs, LI (April 1973), p. 493.
1°A1-Usbua Al-Arabi
p. 3.

[The Arab Week] (Beirut), December 17, 1972,
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Finally, it should be noted that the various Arab states have
attained their independence at different dates; they have had varying
experiences and possess different traditions; they are ruled by a
miscellany of systems that no two Arab states have precisely the same
form of government, and they are illinformed about each other because
of the rulers control and suppression.

Besides these, the continuation

of political and internal instability, the continuation of tension between
the Arab states because of power struggle and because of the presence of
foreign influence among the Arab leaders, social and economic backward
ness, localism and national interests, and the unfair distribution of
wealth which have developed a heightened individualism rather than a
consciousness of moving towards unity, all of these would seem to
indicate that Arab unity is still far from realization.

The Arab states

are. in a number of different stages of social and economic developments,
and since the goals and ambitions of the individual Arab rulers are
still at odds, no king or president is ready to submerge his state's
interests or his own personal power in the common purpose of an Arab
nation.

It is likely that things will stay much as they are right now,

but, both the reactionary forces and the forces driving in the direction
of unity will continue powerful for a while.
Regardless of the motivations of the Arab states towards unity,
the prospects for realization of complete political, economic, social and
cultural unity are still remote.

Only time, education and enlightened

leadership can bring to fruition the movement for Arab unity; perhaps a
union on a federal basis is the most sensible way for the Arabs to
realize their goal of unity, as this would give an economic boost which
would stimulate the industrial growth, and at the same time it would
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permit the component parts of the Arab world to move at their own pace in
their own way.

Perhaps a regional merger will take place; such as a

federation of North Africa, another of the Nile Valley, and another of
the Middle East.

But, whatever happens, the forces for union will

remain, and so will the forces for disunion.
the Arabs will in time reach their goals.

History will show whether

"... The way to Arab unity

through the Arab people.

•^Nasser1s speech before a committee of the National Union
General Congress, in Cairo on July 14, 1960. Al-Ahram (Cairo),
July 15, 1960, p. 3.

CHAPTER IV

THE ARAB LEAGUE:

FAILURE AND SUCCESS

Since its establishment in 1945, the Arab League Objectives were
and still are:

The Arabization of Palestine, and the close cooperation

between member states in matters concerning unity of economic and
financial affairs, communications, cultural affairs, problems of
nationality, social affairs and health.
The Palestine problem was the first and still the most important
issue to confront the League since its formation.

In 1945, the Arab

governments unanimously agreed that "the Arabism of Palestine is a vital
element of the Pan-Arabism."1

Just before the partition of Palestine was

resolved, "Amir Abdullah of Transjordan had indicated to Mrs. Golda
Meyerson of the Jewish Agency that in case of partition, he wanted to
annex the area of Palestine awarded to the Arabs."2

Soon after Abdullah's

plans were revealed, the League, at a meeting at Aley in Lebanon, July 28,
1947, resolved to have its members invade Palestine if the United Nations
approved a proposal to partition Palestine.

The League called upon its

members to "send their armies to Palestine to forstall Zionism and at the

•kiirdhari L. Tikku, Islam and its Cultural Divergence (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1971), p. 27.
^Sharef, Three Days, p. 72.
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same time to refrain from claiming territory.occupied by their forces.
Fearful that Egyptian-Saudi forces might enter Palestine and perhaps
endanger his Emirate, Amir Abdullah of Transjordan, on November 11, 1947,
proposed to the League that they should finance a Transjordanian conquest
of Palestine, which he was ready to undertake because "Transjordan was
not a member of the UN and could, therefore, defy with impunity the
partition scheme."^

The proposal was rejected for obvious reasons, and

Egypt and the others decided to put their trust in the Palestinian Arabs,
organized and directed by Hajj Amin Al-Husaini and in the so called Army
of Deliverance to be recruited and financed by them.
After the termination of the British mandate in Palestine in 1948,
the State of Israel was proclaimed and created on May 14, 1948, despite
the attacks from the armies of the neighboring Arab States, "This defeat
not only brought the Arab League into dispute because of League's failure
to produce any kind of military coordination between its members, it also
created a deep-seated bitterness against the Arab governments among the
younger generation of Arabs.
The failure of the Arab League in Palestine could be attributed to
the League's weakness and its general ineffectiveness.

Because it has

effects on the policies of its members only on key issues, it also failed
to establish the entity of "Arab Palestine" because of the "differences

^John Marlowe, The Seat of Pilate (London:
1959), p. 243.

The Cresset Press,

^Hazza Al-Majali, Muthukkarati [My Memoirs]
1963), p. 385.

(Amman:

-’Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment, p. 80.

Istilclal Press,
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between King Farouk and Abdullah"^ who disregarded the League, and also
because of the distrust and lack of cooperation among the several armies.
Palestine was given a special treatment in the League's Pact through
reserving a seat on the Arab League Council for a Palestine representative,
and also by the League's efforts to coordinate military action during
the Arab-Israeli War of 1948-1949, as the League called and urged the
Arab Countries to form an Arab Army of Deliverance.

[The Arab armies

entered the Palestine War in 1948, not under the unified flag of Arab
nationalism, but torn by internal feuds, jealousies and rancor.

There

were seven Arab armies fighting in Palestine under 6 or 7 different and
separate commands.]

But, in spite of that, for many Palestinians, the

League had betrayed them and betrayed Palestine!

It failed to stop

Jordan from annexing the west bank, and it failed to create a Palestinian
state in Gaza Strip, a state that would represent the Palestinians at the
UN and to the rest of the world.
After the defeat in Palestine, the League failed to coordinate the
Arabs in the struggle against Israel.

Habib Bourgiba of Tunisia and

King Hassan II of Morocco refused to join a front against Israel, "as
Bourgiba was attempting to recognize the Zionist State of Israel.
Tunisia's voice at the Arab League was and still is regarded as a Western
voice rather than that of an Arab, and this widened the gulf between
Tunisia and most of the Arab States.

^William R. Polk, The United States and the Arab World (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 205.
^Newsweek (New York), May 10, 1965, p. 50.
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The League's failure in Palestine and its failure to coordinate the
Arabs in the struggle against Israel, left an impression among the Arab
Nationalists that the Arab League would never come to serve as the
primary medium for inter-Arab relations or as the foundation for Arab
solidarity.

The radical Pan-Arabists had long complained that the League

was more of an obstacle to Arab unity than an aid to it, because it
sanctified the separate sovereignties of its members, and by forbidding
them to interfere in each other's internal affairs hampered the spirit
of the revolution in the Arab society, which was the only solid basis
on which eventual unity could be built.

While these quarrels raged,

the

League was naturally powerless and lost its effectiveness because of the
lack of a general desire for cooperation among the member states.
In 1955 the League had been paralyzed by the struggle between
Egypt and Iraq over the Baghdad Pact, and in 1958 by the landing of the
American Marines in Lebanon and the return of the British troops to
Jordan, and in 1960 by the vicious propaganda between the UAR and Jordan
after the assassination of the Jordanian Prime Minister, Hazza Al-Majali;
at the same time an ideological quarrel was going on between Nasser of
Egypt and Kassem of Iraq, and by 1962 first Iraq and then Egypt were
boycotting the sessions of the League during the dispute over Kuwait.
Also there was a split between the League members over the issue of the
Yemeni Revolution of 1962, and the intervention of Egypt, Saudi Arabia
and Jordan in that war.
Although they carried out their vicious propaganda against each
other through a media campaign, Arab leaders carried out such propaganda
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to the League’s meetings ignoring and hindering the objectives of the
League. On August 17, 1962 at a meeting of the League council at the
Lebanese town of Shtura, Syria and-Egypt confronted each other by filing
complaints and accusations.

The Syrian delegates distributed copies of

a "Black Book" that presented a detailed list of sins committed by the
Egyptian authorities during the union of the two countries.

The UAR in

turn accused the Syrian government of conducting a torture campaign
against nationalist elements in Syria, and of serving the purpose of
imperialism.

Mr. Dayri, the Egyptian representative, protested the Syrian

accusations and condemned the League:

"The Arab League," he said, "has

become a humiliation to its member states, it can do nothing for the
aspirations of the Arab s t r u g g l e . M r . Abdel-Khaliq Hassouna, the
Egyptian Secretary-General of the Arab League, broke down in tears!

This

brought the Arab League to a point of collapse, as the UAR of Egypt had
withdrawn, and the Egyptian government ignored the League for over a
year.

The Iraqi government, which was still demanding the annexation of

Kuwait, had not attended the Shtura meeting.
By the middle of 1963, the Arab world was at the climax of Arab
quarrels, with revoluntionary powers pitted against conservatives or
moderate regimes:

Egypt, Algeria, Iraq, the Republic of Yemen, and Syria,

variously, against the others.

But, the most bitter disputes were the

rival revolutionary movements of Syria and Egypt, who were boycotting the
League because of the presence of their rivals at the League’s meetings.

^An-Nahar (Beirut), August 23, 1962, p. 3.
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Also Morocco was boycotting the League after the border incident with
Algeria in November 1963.
Because of rivalries, distrust, and disputes, the Arab leaders
dominated the League with their separate and national interests; and in
order to achieve their particularistic goals and objectives, they formed
bloc patterns within the League, which narrowed the League's range of
action because particularistic goals and objectives conflict with a
collective action, and this " . . .

seemed greater by contrast with the

ideals which the League was intended to achieve.
Besides its failure in Palestine, the Arab League failed to bring
unity to the Arab world.

In 1951, Nazim Al-Kudsi, Prime Minister of

Syria, proposed an immediate Arab union by the Arab League.

His plan

was submitted to the League Council on January 23, 1951 for study and
comment, but it was shelved at the request of the Council members.

In

January 1954, Iraq's Prime Minister, Fadhil Al-Jamali, proposed a plan
for the unification of Arab ministries of foreign affairs, education, war,
finance, and economics under the supervision of the Arab League, when
his plan reached the League Council it was rejected by most of the members,
and on March 22, 1960 at the dedication of the League's new Secretariat
Building in Cairo, when Hassouna, the Secretary-General, called for
complete Arab union; "Lebanon immediately rejected the idea; and one
member of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies urged that the Lebanese

^T. R. Russel, "The Arab League:
Journal, X (Spring, 1956).

A Reassessment," Middle East
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government demand the resignation of Hassouna and withdraw from the Arab
League."10
The League's failure to bring unity to the Arab world could be
attributed to the unwillingness of and lack of cooperation among its
members, and to the founders of the League as they "made a definite, if
reluctant, decision against Arab unity and in favor of regional organi
zation. n11
After the loss of Palestine to the Zionists in 1948, the Arab League
bent its efforts toward helping the Arab states to achieve their independ
ence from Britain and France.

It carried out their aspiration for

independence; it supported them financially, acted on their behalf to the
imperialistic powers, "Britain and France," advocated their cause at the
United Nations and carried it to the world capitals, it requested NATO
powers in 1959 not to support France in her military campaign in Algeria,
and on September 26, 1959 the League proclaimed the creation of the
Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic," which in fact was a
"government in exile."

Sudan, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Kuwait, and

Algeria owed their independence to the Arab League.
Besides helping the Arab states to achieve their independence, the
League concentrated on the problem of security and in coordinating actions
against external threats involving its members; it launched the boycott
against Israel in 1950, it took the Palestine issue to the members of

•*-0Al-Gomhouriya (Cairo), March 25, 1960, p. 5.
■^Macdonald, The League of Arab States, p. 53.
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Afro-Asian blocs and urged them to boycott Israel since the Bandung
conference of 1955, it supported Egypt's policy of nationalizing of the
Suez Canal, July 26, 1956, and of denying Israel the use of the canal.

It

stood firmly behind Egypt during the Suez War when France, Britain, and
Israel invaded Egypt on October 30, 1956, during the Lebanese crisis in
1958, and after the landing of the American Marines in Lebanon at the
request of Chamouns government, the Arab League with the assistance of
the UN Secretary-General Dag Hammerskjold was successful in resolving the
crisis and urging the immediate withdrawal of the American Marines, and
in 1961, the League succeeded in settling the Iraqi dispute over Kuwait.
When in December 1963 Israel announced its plan for the diversion
of the Jordan River, the League emphasized its seriousness and "called
for a Joint Arab Military Command"-^ which came into effect on January 17,
1964.

And on May 24, 1964, "the League established under the Palestine

Arab Leadership the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)"-^ which
comes under the League's autopsy.
By May 27, 1967, the League had unanimously "declared the solidarity
of the Arab world .with the United Arab Republic"^ against the expected
Israeli attack.

After the Arab defeat in the Arab-Israeli War of 1967,

the League at the November 1967 Arab conference in Khartoum presented the
real Arab terms concerning Israel:

"No recognition of Israel, no peace

■^Alfred M. Lilienthal, The Other Side of the Coin, p. 262.
■^Jacob C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1969), p. 360.
■^Pollc, The United States and the Arab World, p. 297.
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with Israel, and no freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal, as long as
Israel ignores the return of the Palestinians to P a l e s t i n e . A n d
recently during the last Arab-Israeli October War of 1973, the League
stood as firm as ever in solidarity with Egypt and Syria, urging all the
Arab countries to do all they could to liberate the occupied Arab land.
The League lent its support to the oil embargo which has been used against
the United States and against countries who are in sympathy with Israel.
Despite its failure in Palestine, in the achievement of Arab unity,
in settling some of Arab disputes, and in coordinating actions against
external threats involving its member states, despite that, the League
was successful and played an important role in promoting cooperation
[promoting cooperation in all spheres among the Arab states is one of the
main objectives of the Arab League since its formation in 1945] among the
Arab states.

An economic council was established under the Joint Defense

and Economic Cooperation Treaty of 1950, to coordinate and unify the
economic policies, commerce, trade, and financial developments of the
Arab states.

Also in 1950, the boycott against Israel was launched

imposing economic sanctions upon and through those states with which
Israel did business and upon whose support Israel relied for her contin
uing existence.

The boycott aimed at the withholding of business by all

Arab states from those Western firms that might establish factories,
branches, and agencies in Israel, extend credit to the Israeli government
and its agencies, license patents for Israeli use or take part in other

^ Al-Hayat (Beirut), November 28, 1967, p. 1.
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activities calculated to advance the interests of the Zionist state.
The boycott was not uniformly successful because not all Arab
governments applied it with equal enthusiasm.

Some, such as Jordan,

under Western political pressure, deliberately evaded it.

Thus King

Abdullah made a secret deal in 1950 to permit the Israelis to move their
commerce through his territory.
less spectacular.
Americans.

Most of the history of the boycott was

Its enforcement hit hardest at the British and

A British insurance firm with heavy interests in the Arab

world forced a Zionist Jew to resign from its board of directors in order
to protect its Arab business.

The Coca-Cola Company granted a franchise

to a bottler in Israel, and most Arab countries, led by Egypt, barred
Coca-Cola from their territories; also, Ford-made cars were banned from
the Arab countries because Ford had an assembly line in Israel.
biggest Japanese industrial firms —
Honda among them —

The

Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Toyotoa, and

refused to sell to or buy from Israel.

"During Expo

'70, at Osaka, Japan, the Israeli Airline, El-Al, was not given landing
rights.
Regional economic integration, nevertheless, has been a constant
concern of the League, and some progress has been made despite apparently
overwhelming political obstacles.

Two formal economic treaties, the

Convention for Facilitating Trade Exchange and the Regulation of Transit
Trade Between the Arab League, were signed in March 1953.
In 1954, the Arab Postal Union was founded' by the League to
establish more strict postal relations between the Arab countries than

"^Fisher, Storm Over the Arab World, p. 308.
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those laid down by the Universal Postal Union, to pursue the development
and modernization of postal services in member countries.
In June 1957, the Arab Development Bank was established, and "the
bank was formally inaugurated in January 1959 starting with a capital of
20 million Egyptian p o u n d s . T h e

Bank proposed projects for joint

Arab commercial ventures including the Arab Tanker Company, the Arab
Shipping Company, Arab Airline Company, and the Arab Pipeline Company.
But, "the only joint venture to show any sign of progress has been the
Arab Potash Company.
In 1958, the Arab Telecommunications Union was founded to coordinate
and develop telecommunications between the Arab countries; to exchange
technical aid and to encourage research.
In June 1962, five Arab League members (Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco,
Syria, and UAR) signed an agreement providing "for the establishment of
a council for Arab Economic Union, and the result was the establishment
—

only on paper —

of the Arab Common Market.

On February 13, 1964, an Arab Educational, Cultural and Scientific
Organization founded by the League to promote the ideals of Arab Cultural
Unity and particularly to establish specialized institutes propagating
Arab ideals and preparing research workers specializing in Arab

^Robert W. Macdonald, The League of Arab States (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 203.

•^Kamal s. Sayegh, Oil and Arab Regional Development (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1968), p. 208.
•^Al-Ahram, June 19, 1962, p. 1.
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Civilization.

Through this organization an Arab League Permanent Dele

gation has been established at UNESCO headquarters in Paris, and may act
on behalf of Arab states not having delegates at the UNESCO.

Each member

state submits an annual report on progress in education, cultural matters,
and science.

The first session of the. organization's General Conference

was held in Cairo, July 7 - August 25, 1970.
Arab Regional Literacy Organization:

The organization includes:
Cairo.

Institute of Arab Research and Studies:
Institute of Arabic Manuscripts:

Cairo.

Cairo.

Permanent Bureau for Co-ordination of Arabization in the Arab
World:

Rabat.

Museum of Arab Culture:

Cairo.

Arab States Industrial Development Centre:

Cairo.

In 1965, an Arab Labor Organization was established for cooperation
between member states in labor problems, unification of labor legislation
and general conditions of work wherever possible, research, technical
assistance, social insurance, and training.

An Arab Air Carriers'

Organization (AACO) was founded in 1965 to coordinate and promote coop
eration in the activities of Arab airline companies, and in April 1965 the
Arab States Broadcasting Union and the Federation of Arab News Agencies
were founded to work together on the establishment of an Arab Central
News Agency.
In 1967, an Arab Council for Civil Aviation was founded to control
and coordinate the technical aspects of aviation between the Arab
countries.
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In 1968, the Arab Organization for Standardization and Metrology
(ASMO) was founded to assist in the establishment of national standard
ization and metrology bodies in the Arab States, coordinate and unify
specifications and standards; to unify technical terms and symbols,
methods of testing, analysis, measurements, calibration and quality control
systems; and to coordinate Arab activities in these areas with corre
sponding internal efforts.
In 1969, the Arab Organization for Administrative Sciences was
founded to develop administrative sciences and improve administrative
machinery and financial affairs related to administration.
In 1971, the Arab Engineering Union was founded to cooperate with
the Arab League in matters concerning the engineering profession; it
holds a conference on scientific engineering studies every two years.
Also, conferences and congresses were sponsored by the League on
medicine, the press, Islam, Arab history, oil concessions, the petroleum
industry, banking, chemistry, pharmacy, law, dentistry, industrial
development, tourism, engineering and many other subjects and professional
fields.
Since its establishment in 1945, the membership of the Arab League
grew in numbers as it became the only body in the world which represents
as one nation nineteen independent states, extending from the Atlantic
Ocean to the Arabian Gulf.

All proclaim their desire to be unified into

a single nation, providing an organization through which the various
states can work together by voluntary cooperation in all spheres.
The continuation of crisis in the Arab world since 1945, created a
power struggle among the members of the Arab League, and led to the
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instability of the Arab world, thus hindering achievement of the objectives
of the League through the unpredictable political movements and tensions
of the member states.

But, in spite of that the League survived as a

"symbol of unity, an alliance of states joined together in deference to
the widespread yearning for unity among the Arab people."19
So often the Arab League has been criticized for its failure to
make any progress in limiting the authority of its members, its failure in
liberating Palestine, and its failure in achieving an Arab unity for
which the League was created!

But, the pact of the League provided for

the protection of the sovereignty of the individual states, and thus,
the members obtained an assurance against each other's aspiration, and
this made it impossible for the League to act decisively in the questions
of Palestine and in forcing decisions on its members.

On the question

of unity, the pact of the League does not make any reference to eventual
Arab unity, as it emphasizes respect for the independence and sovereignty
of its members states through Article 9, which permits "close cooperation
9n

and stronger bonds.MZ,U
future.

Between member states which desire them in the

Nevertheless, "the League has powerfully contributed to the

strengthening of Arab feeling,"*
21 and has made significant progress with
0
2
its economic, social, and cultural programs.
Many Arabs and foreigners praise the League for its role in
promoting relations within the Arab world and for its settling of Arab

•^Fayez A. Sayegh, Arab Unity:
Devin-Adair, Inc., 1958), p. 121.
20
21

Hope and Fulfillment (New York:

See Appendix B.

Jacques Berque, The Arabs-Their History and Future (New York:
Frederick A. Praege, Inc., 1964), p. 249.
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disputes by means of arbitration and mediation.

It should be noted that

despite the League's pact which prohibits the intervention of one member
in another's affairs, the League failed to prevent its members from
interfering in the domestic affairs of other state members:

Syria inter

fered in the affairs of Lebanon and Jordan, Iraq interfered in the affairs
of Kuwait, and Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan interfered in the affairs of
Yemen, and for that the League showed its impotence in the Arab world
mainly after its inability to play any useful role in the conflict over
the Civil War in Yemen, which broke out in -September 1962 and into which
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan were soon drawn.

Again, the League was

useless in settling some of the Arab disputes, such as in 1963 when the
border incident between Algeria and Morocco which occured in November
1963 was mediated by the Organization of African Unity and when Morocco's
king refused to accept an Arab League arbitration proposal.
Although the Arab League was concentrated on the problem of
external threats including threats from Israel the League had failed to
prevent the landing of American Marines in Lebanon, the return of. British
troops in Jordan in 1958, and the taking of any action against Iran which
annexed three Arabian gulf islands (Abu Musa, Greater Tumb, Leser Tumb)
in November 30, 1974.
Despite its failure in Palestine, in the achievement of Arab unity,
in settling some of Arab disputes, and in coordinating an action against
external threats involving its members, the League's success or failure
could be attributed to the willingness of its members to cooperate within
its framework of cooperation.

The Arab League will most likely remain

ineffective politically, no matter how conditions change.

The League
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will still be a place for Arab meetings to settle Arab disputes and coor
dinate better relations among the Arab States, but, in the course of
eventual Arab unity, the League is still too far from such a goal, as it
wasn't designed to reach such a goal.

As a League Publication declares,

"The Arab League is not an end in the Arab aspirations for unity . . .

it

is simply a regional organization including every Arab State from Morocco
to Iraq."22

^ The Arab World (New York:

Arab Information. Center), p. 4.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION
Since the beginning of the century, the Arabs have made several
attempts to achieve an Arab unity; they rid themselves of the Ottoman
domination at the beginning of World War I, then they fought the Western
Powers and achieved their independence.
In 1945, the Arabs established the League of Arab States as an
organization through which the various Arab states could work together
by voluntary cooperation in all spheres, and in hopes of preventing the
creation of a Zionist state in Arab Palestine by strengthening their
ties.
Since the Arabs experienced their defeats in Palestine, many
important developments in the Arab World, both in the internal and
external fields, played a role in shaping the goals and aspirations of
the Arab leaders.

Several attempts for Arab Unity were made, but all

failed because of the instability in the Arab World, and also because
of the lack of cooperation among the Arab leaders.

Rivalries, disputes,

hatred and mistrust existed among the Arab leaders, creating several
alignments and conflicts, hindering the Arab League activities as the
Arab leaders carried their disputes and rivalries to the League, and
used the League to serve their purposes and interests.
The Arab League activities were and still are controlled and
influenced by its members.

They have been affected by the political
46
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divisions among its members as well as the conditions prevailing in the
Arab world since its formation.
In the economic, cultural and social areas, the Arab League has
been successful because of the willingness of its members to cooperate
in such areas.

In the political sphere, the unifying focus of the Arab

League activity has been the common hostility of the member states
towards Israel,

The League has frequently rejected the legitimacy of

Israel, while calling for a return of the Palestinian refugees to their
former homes.

And in addition the League has founded an Arab Joint

Defense Council and the permanent Military Commission providing forums
for cooperation on military activities related to the Arab Israeli
Conflict.
Regardless of the League's failure in Palestine and in achieving
an Arab unity, the Arab League will most likely continue to reflect the
balance among Arab governments and the prevailing opinion in the Arab
world no matter how conditions change.

Despite their divisions, the

Arabs themselves recognize the League as an enduring institution.

It

survived the disasters of the Palestine War 1948, and Abdullah's dis
loyal conduct in annexing a large part of Palestine.

Even Iraq, when it

signed the Baghdad Pact, made much of its continued loyalty to the Arab
League by attending some of its meetings and by participating in some of
its programs.

Egypt, despite its threats to withdraw, never carried

them out,
Finally, the Arab League and Arab unity will remain the sacred
hope for the Arabs and Arab nationalists.

The League will continue to

function voluntarily as long as the Arab leaders are willing to cooperate,

48

and the drive for Arab unity will be carried on by the Arab leaders as
all associate themselves with Arab unity and Arab nationalism.

APPENDIX A:

THE ALEXANDRIA PROTOCOL1

The chiefs and members of the Syrian, Trans-Jordanian, Iraqi,
Lebanese and Egyptian delegations at the Preliminary Committee of the
General Arab Conference,
Anxious to strengthen and consolidate the ties which bind all Arab
countries and to direct them toward the welfare of the Arab world, to
improve its conditions, insure its future, and realize its hopes and
aspirations,
And in response to Arab public opinion in all Arab countries,
Have met at Alexandria from Shawwal 8, 1363 (September 25, 1944),
in the form of a Preliminary Committee of the General Arab Conference,
and have agreed as follows:

1.

League of Arab States

A League will be formed of the independent Arab States which
consent to join the League. It will have a council which will be known
as the "Council of the League of Arab States," in which all participating
states will be represented on an equal footing.
The object of the League will be to control the execution of the
agreements which the above states will conclude; to hold periodic meetings
which will strengthen the relations between those states; to coordinate
their political plans so as to insure their cooperation, and protect
their independence and sovereignty against every agression by suitable
means; and to supervise in a general way the affairs and interests of
the Arab countries.
The decisions of the Council will be binding on those who have
accepted them except in cases where a disagreement arises between two
member states of the League in which the two parties shall refer their
dispute to the Council for solution.' In this case the decisions of the
Council of the League will be binding.
In no case will resort to force to settle ’a dispute between any
two member states of the League be allowed. But every state shall be
free to conclude with any other member state of the League, or other

1Source: The Arab World [Arab Information Center, New York]
v (April 1959), 15-16.
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powers, special agreements which do not contradict the text or spirit of
the present dispositions.
In no case will the adoption of a foreign policy which may be
prejudicial to the policy of the League or an individual member state
be allowed.
The Council will intervene in every dispute which may lead to
war between a member state of the League and any other member state or
power, so as to reconcile them.
A subcommittee will be formed of the members of the Preliminary
Committee to prepare a draft of the statutes of the Council of the
League and to examine the political questions which may be the object
of agreement among Arab States.

2,

Cooperation in Economic, Cultural, Social and Other Matters

A.
The Arab States represented on the Preliminary Committee shall
closely cooperate in the following matters:
(1) Economic and financial matters, i.e., commercial exchange,
customs, currency, agriculture, and industry.
(2) Communications, i.e., railways, roads, aviation, navigation,
posts and telegraphs.
(3) Cultural matters.
(4) Questions of nationality, passports, visas, execution of
judgments, extradition of criminals, etc.
(5) Social questions.
(6) Questions of public health.
B.
A subcommittee of experts for each of the above subjects will
be formed in which the states which have participated in the Preliminary
Committee will be represented. This subcommittee will prepare draft
regulations for cooperation in the above matters, describing the extent
and means of that collaboration.
C. A committee for coordination and editing will be formed whose
object will be to control the work of the other subcommittees, to
coordinate that part of the work which is accomplished, and to prepare
drafts of agreements which will be submitted to the various governments.
D. When all the subcommittees have accomplished their work the
Preliminary Committee will meet to examine the work of the subcommittee
as a preliminary step toward the holding of a General Arab Conference.

3.

Consolidation of These Ties in the

Future

While expressing its satisfaction at such a happy step, the
Committee hopes that Arab States will be able in the future to
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consolidate that step by other steps, especially if postwar events should
result in institutions which bind various Powers more closely together.

4.

A Special Resolution Concerning Lebanon

The Arab States represented on the Preliminary Committee emphasize
their respect of the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon in its
present frontiers, which the governments of the above States have
already recognized in consequence of Lebanon's adoption of an independent
policy, which the Government of that country announced in its program of
October 7, 1943, unanimously approved by the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies

5.

A Special Resolution Concerning Palestine

A. The Committee is of the opinion that Palestine constitutes an
important part of the Arab World and that the rights of the Arabs in
Palestine cannot be touched without prejudice to peace and stability
in the Arab World.
The Committee also is of the opinion that the pledges binding the
British Government and providing for the cessation of Jewish immigration,
the preservation of Arab lands, and the achievement of independence for
Palestine are permanent Arab rights whose prompt implementation would
constitute a step toward the desired goal and toward the stabilization
of peace and security.
The Committee declares its support of the cause of the Arabs of
Palestine and its willingness to work for the achievement of their
legitimate aim and the safeguarding of their just rights.
The Committee also declares that it is second to none in regretting
the woes which have been inflicted upon the Jews of Europe by European
dictatorial states. But the question of these Jews should not be
confused with Zionism, for there can be no greater injustice and
aggression than solving the problem of the Jews of Europe by another
injustice, i.e., by inflicting injustice on the Arabs of Palestine of
various religions and denominations.
B. The special proposal concerning the participation of the
Arab Governments and peoples in the "Arab National Fund" to safeguard
the lands of the Arabs of Palestine shall be referred to the committee
of financial and economic affairs to examine it from all its angles and
to submit the results of that examination to the Preliminary Committee
in its next meeting.
In faith of which this protocol has been signed at Faruq I Uni
versity at Alexandria on Saturday, Shawwal 20, 1363 (October 7, 1944).

APPENDIX B:

HIS
HIS
HIS
HIS
HIS
HIS
HIS

PACT OF THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES1

EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SYRIAN REPUBLIC;
ROYAL HIGHNESS THE AMIR OF TRANS-JORDAN;
MAJESTY THE KING OF IRAQ;
MAJESTY THE KING OF SAUDI ARABIA;
EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT OF THE LEBANESE REPUBLIC;
MAJESTY THE KING OF EGYPT;
MAJESTY THE KING OF THE YEMEN;

Desirous of strengthening the close relations and numerous ties
which link the Arab States;
And Anxious to support and stabilize these ties upon a basis of
respect for the independence and sovereignty of these states, and to
direct their efforts toward the common good of all the Arab countries,
the improvement of their status, the security of their future, the
realization of their aspirations and hopes;
And responding to the wishes of Arab public opinion in all Arab
lands;
Having agreed to conclude a Pact to that end and having appointed
as their representatives the persons whose names are listed hereinafter,
have agreed upon the following provisions:

Article 1. The League of Arab States is composed of the independent
Arab States which have signed this Pact.
Any independent Arab State has the right to become a member of the
League. If it desires to do so, it shall submit a request which will be
deposited with the Permanent Secretariat General and submitted to the
Council at the first meeting held after submission of the request.

Article 2. The League has as its purpose the strengthening of the
relations between the member states; the coordination of their policies
in order to achieve cooperation between them and to safeguard their
independence and sovereignty; and a general concern with the affairs
and interests of the Arab countries. It has also as its purpose the
close cooperation of the member states, with due regard to the organiza
tion and circumstances of each state, on the following matters:

1Signed March 22, 1945.

Source:

16-18.
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The Arab World, v (April 1959),
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A. Economic and financial affairs, including commercial relations,
customs, currency, and questions of agriculture and industry.
B. Communications; this includes railroads, roads, aviation,
navigation, telegraphs, and posts.
C.

Cultural affairs.

D. Nationality, passports, visas, execution of judgments, and
extradition of criminals.
E.

Social affairs.

F.

Health problems.

Article 3. The League shall possess a Council composed of the represen
tatives of the member states of the League; each state shall have a
single vote, irrespective of the number of its representatives.
It shall be the task of the Council to achieve the realization of
the objectives of the League and to supervise the execution of agree
ments which the member states have concluded on the questions enumerated
in the preceding article, or on any other questions.
It likewise shall be the Council's task to decide upon the means
by which the League is to cooperate with the international bodies to be
created in the future in order to guarantee security and peace and
regulate economic and social relations.

Article 4. For each of the questions listed in Article 2 there shall be
set up a special committee in which the member states of the League
shall be represented. These committees shall be charged with the task
of laying down the principles and extent of cooperation.
Such
principles shall be formulated as draft agreements, to be presented
to the Council for examination preparatory to their submission to the
aforesaid states.
Representatives of the other Arab countries may take part in the
work of the aforesaid committees. The Council shall determine the
conditions under which these representatives may be permitted to
participate and the rules governing such representation.

Article 5. Any resort to force in order to resolve disputes arising
between two or more member states of the League is prohibited. If there
should arise among them a difference which does not concern a state's
independence, sovereignty, or territorial integrity, and if the parties
to the dispute have recourse to the Council for the settlement of this
difference, the decision of the Council shall then be enforceable and
obligatory.
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In such a case, the states between whom the difference has arisen
shall not participate ii\ the deliberations and decisions of the Council.
The Council shall mediate in all differences which threaten to
lead to war between two member states, or a member state and a third
state, with a view to bringing about their reconciliation.
Decisions of arbitration and mediation shall be taken by
majority vote.

Article 6. In case of aggression or threat of aggression by one state
against a member state, the state which has been attacked or threatened
with aggression may demand the immediate convocation of the Council.
The Council shall by unanimous decision determine the measures
necessary to repulse the aggression.
If the aggressor is a member
state, his vote shall not be counted in determining unanimity.
If, as a result of the attack, the government of the state
attacked finds itself unable to communicate with the Council, that
state's representative in the Council shall have the right to request
the convocation of the Council for the purpose indicated in the fore
going paragraph. In the event that this representative is unable to
communicate with the Council, any member state of the League shall
have the right to request the convocation of the Council.

Article 7. Unanimous decisions of the Council shall be binding upon all
member states of the League; majority decisions shall be binding only
upon those states which have accepted them.
In either case the decisions of the Council shall be enforced in
each member state according to its respective basic laws.

Article 8. Each member state shall respect the systems of government
established in the other member states and regard them as exclusive
concerns of those states. Each shall pledge to abstain from any action
calculated to change established systems of government.

Article 9. States of the League which desire to establish closer coopera
tion and stronger bonds than are provided by this Pact may conclude
agreements to that end.
Treaties and agreements already concluded or to be concluded in
the future between a member state and another state shall not be binding
or restrictive upon other members.
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Article 10. The permanent seat of the League of Arab States is esta
blished in Cairo. The Council may, however, assemble at any other place
it may designate.

Article 11. The Council of the League shall convene in ordinary session
twice a year, in March and in October. It shall convene in extraordinary
session upon the request of two member states of the League whenever the
need arises.

Article 12. The League shall have a permanent Secretariat-General which
shall consist of a Secretary-General, Assistant Secretaries, and an
appropriate number of officials.
The Council of the League shall appoint the Secretary-General by a
majority of two-thirds of the states of the League. The SecretaryGeneral, with the approval of the Council shall appoint the Assistant
Secretaries and the principal officials of the League.
The Council of the League shall establish an administrative
regulation for the functions of the Secretariat-General and matters
relating to the Staff.
The Secretary-General shall have the rank of Ambassador and the
Assistant Secretaries that of Ministers Plenipotentiary.

Article 13. The Secretary-General shall prepare the draft of the budget
of the League and shall submit it to the Council for approval before
the beginning of each fiscal year.

Article 14. The members of the Council of the League as well as the
members of the committees and the officials who are to be designated in
the administrative regulation shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and
immunity when engaged in the exercise of their functions.
The building occupied by the organs of the League shall be
inviolable.

Article 15. The first meeting of the Council shall be convened at the
invitation of the head of the Egyptian Government. Thereafter it shall
be convened at the invitation of the Secretary-General.
The representatives of the member states of the League shall
alternately assume the presidency of the Council at each of its ordinary
sessions.
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Article 16. Except in cases specifically indicated in this Pact, a
majority vote of the Council shal] be sufficient to make enforceable
decisions on the following matters:
A.

Matters relating to personnel,

B.

Adoption of the budget of the League.

C. Establishment of the administrative regulation for
the committee, and the Secretariat-General.
D.

Council,

Decisions to adjourn the sessions.

Article 17. Each member state of the League shall deposit with the
Secretariat-General one copy of every treaty or agreement concluded
in the future between itself and another member state of the League
or a third state.

Article 18. If a member state contemplates withdrawal from the League,
it shall inform the Council of its intention one year before such
withdrawal is to go into effect.
The Council of the League may consider any state which fails to
fulfill its obligations under this Pact as having become separated
from the League, this to go into effect upon a unanimous decision of
the states, not counting the state concerned.

Article 19. This Pact may be amended with the consent of two-thirds of
the states belonging to the League, especially in order to make firmer
and stronger the ties between the member states, to create an Arab
Tribunal of Arbitration, and to regulate the relations of the League
with any international bodies to be created in the future to guarantee
security and peace.
Final action on an amendment cannot be taken prior to the session
following the session in which the motion was initiated.
If a state does not accept such an amendment it may withdraw at
such time as the amendment goes into effect, without being bound by the
provisions of the preceding article.

Article 20. This Pact and its Annexes shall be ratified according to
the basic laws in force among the High Contracting Parties.
The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the
Secretariat-General of the Council and the Pact shall become operative
as regards each ratifying state fifteen days after the SecretaryGeneral has received the instruments of ratification from four states.
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This Pact has been drawn up in Cairo in the Arabic language on
this 8th day of Rabi' II, thirteen hundred and sixty-four (March 22,
1945), in one copy which shall be deposited in the safekeeping of the
Secretariat-General.
An identical copy shall be delivered to each state of the League.
[Here follow the signatures]

(1) Annex Regarding Palestine
Since the termination of the last great war the rule of the
Ottoman Empire over the Arab countries, among them Palestine, which had
become detached from that Empire, has come to an end. She has come to
be autonomous, not subordinate to any other state.
The Treaty of Lausanne proclaimed that her future was to be
settled by the parties concerned.
However, even though she was as yet unable to control her own
affairs, the Covenant of the League (of Nations) in 1919 made provision
for a regime based upon recognition of her independence.
Her international existence and independence in the legal sense
cannot, therefore, be questioned, any more than could the independence
of the other Arab countries.
Although the outward manifestations of this independence have
remained obscured for reasons beyond her control, this should not be
allowed to interfere with her participation in the work of the Council
of the League.
The states signatory to the Pact of the Arab League are therefore
of the opinion that, considering the special circumstances of Palestine
and until that country can effectively exercise its independence, the
Council of the League should take charge of the selection of an Arab
representative from Palestine to take part in its work.

(2) Annex Regarding Cooperation with Countries
of the Council of the League

Which Are Not Members

Whereas the member states of the League will have to deal in the
Council as well as in the committees with matters which will benefit and
affect the Arab world at large;
And whereas the Council has to take into account the aspirations
of the Arab countries which are not members of the Council and has to
work toward their realization;
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Now, therefore, it particularly behooves the states signatory to
the Pact of the Arab League to enjoin the Council of the League, when con
sidering the admission of those countries to participation in the
committees referred to in the Pact, that it should spare no effort to
learn their needs and understand their aspirations and hopes; and that
it should work thenceforth for their best interests and the safeguarding
of their future with all the political means at its disposal.

(3) Annex Regarding the Appointment of a Secretary-General of the League
The states signatory to this Pact have agreed to appoint His
Excellency Abdul-Rahman 'Azzam Bey, to be Secretary-General of the
League of Arab States.
This appointment is made for two years. The Council of the League
shall hereafter determine the new regulations for the Secretary-General.

APPENDIX C:

JOINT DEFENSE AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION

TREATY BETWEEN THE STATES OF THE ARAB LEACUE1

The Governments of:
THE
THE
THE
THE
THE
THE
THE

HASHIMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN
SYRIAN REPUBLIC
KINGDOM OF IRAQ
KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA
LEBANESE REPUBLIC
KINGDOM OF EGYPT
MOTAWAKILITE KINGDOM OF YEMEN

In view of the desire of the above-mentioned Governments to consol
idate relations between the States of the Arab League; to maintain their
independence and their mutual heritage; in accordance with the desire of
their peoples, to cooperate for the realization of mutual defense and the
maintenance of security and peace according to the principles of both the
Arab League Pact and the United Nations Charter, together with the aims
of the said Pacts; and to consolidate stability and security and provide
means of welfare and development in the countries.
The following government delegates of . . . , having been duly
accredited and fully authorized by their respective governments, approve
the following:

Article 1. The Contracting States, in an effort to maintain and stabilize
peace and security, hereby confirm their desire to settle their inter
national disputes by peaceful means, whether such disputes concern
relations among themselves or with other powers.

Article 2. The Contracting States consider any [act of] armed aggression
made against any one or more of them or their armed forces, to be directed
against them all. Therefore, in accordance with the right of self-defense,
individually and collectively, they undertake to go without delay to the
aid of the State or States against which such an act of aggression is

•^-Signed by Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Yemen on June 17,
1950; by Iraq on February 2, 1951; and by Jordan on February 16, 1952.
Source: The Arab World, v (April 1959), 18-19.
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made, and immediately to take, individually and collectively, all steps
available, including the use of armed force, to repel the aggression and
restore security and peace. In conformity with Article 6 of the Arab
League Pact and Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the Arab League
Council and U.N. Security Council shall be notified of such act of
aggression and the means and procedure taken to check it.

Article 3. At the invitation of any one of the signatories of this Treaty
the Contracting States shall hold consultations whenever there are reason
able grounds for the belief that the territorial integrity, independence,
or security of any one of the parties is threatened. In the event of the
threat of war or the existence of an international emergency, the
Contracting States shall immediately proceed to unify their plans and
defensive measures, as the situation may demand.

Article 4. The Contracting States, desiring to implement fully the above
obligations and effectively carry them out, shall cooperate in consolidating
and coordinating their armed forces, and shall participate according to
their resources and needs in preparing individual and collective means of
defense to repulse the said armed aggression.

Article 5. A Permanent Military Commission composed of representatives of
the General Staffs of the armies of the Contracting States shall be formed
to draw up plans of joint defense and their implementation. The duties of
the Permanent Military Commission which are set forth in an Annex attached
to this Treaty, include the drafting of necessary reports on the method of
cooperation and participation mentioned in Article 4. The Permanent
Military Commission shall submit to the Joint Defense Council, provided
hereunder in Article 6, reports dealing with questions within its province.

Article 6. A Joint Defense Council under the supervision of the Arab
League Council shall be formed to deal with all matters concerning the
implementation of the provisions of Articles 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this
Treaty. It shall be assisted in the performance of its task by the
Permanent Military Commission referred to in Article 5. The Joint Defense
Council shall consist of the Foreign Ministers and the Defense Ministers
of the Contracting States or their representatives. Decisions taken by
a two-thirds majority shall be binding on all the Contracting States.

Article 7. The Contracting States, in order to'fulfill the aims of this
Treaty, and to bring security and prosperity in the Arab countries, and
iii an effort to raise the standard of living in them, undertake to cooperate
in the development of their economies and the explication of their natural
resources; to facilitate the exchange of their respective agricultural and
industrial products; and generally to organize and coordinate their
economic activities and to conclude the necessary inter-Arab agreements
to realize such aims.
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Article 8. An Economic Council consisting of the Ministers in charge of
economic affairs, or their representatives if necessary, shall be formed
by the Contracting States to submit recommendations for the realization
of all such aims as are set forth in the performance of its duties, seek
the cooperation of the Committee for Financial and Economic Affairs
referred to in Article 4 of the Arab League Pact.

Article 9. The Annex to this Treaty shall be considered an integral and
indivisible part of it.

Article 10. The Contracting States undertake to conclude no international
agreements which may be contradictory to the provisions of this Treaty,
nor to act, in their international relations, in a way which may be contrary
to the aims of this Treaty.

Article 11. No provision of this Treaty shall in any way affect, or is
intended to affect, any of the rights or obligations developing upon the
Contracting States from the United Nations Charter or the responsibilities
borne by the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of inter
national peace and security.

Article 12. After a lapse of 10 years from the date of the ratification
of this Treaty, any one of the Contracting States may withdraw from it,
providing 12 months' notice is previously given to the Secretariat-General
of the Arab League. The Secretariat-General of the League shall inform
the other Contracting States of such notice.

Article 13. This Treaty shall be ratified by each Contracting State
according to the constitutional procedure of its own government. The
Treaty shall come into force for the Ratifying States 15 days after the
receipt by the Secretariat-General of the instruments of ratification
from at least four States. This Treaty is drafted in Arabic in Cairo on
April 13, 1950. One signed copy shall be deposited with the SecretariatGeneral of the Arab League; equally authentic copies shall be transmitted
to each of the Contracting States.

MILITARY ANNEX

1.
The Permanent Military Commission provided for in Article 5 of
the Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation Treaty between the States of
the Arab League, shall undertake the following:
(a)
in cooperation with the Joint Defense Council, to prepare plans
to deal with all anticipated dangers or armed aggression that may be
launched against one or more of the Contracting States or their armed
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forces, such plans to be based on the principles determined by the Joint
Defense Council;
(b) to submit proposals for the organization of the forces of the
Contracting States, stipulating the minimum force for each in accordance
with military exigencies and the potentialities of each State;
(c) to submit, proposals for increasing the effectiveness of the
forces of the Contracting States is so far as their equipment, organization,
and training are concerned; so that they may keep pace with modern
military methods and development; and for the unification and coordination
of all such forces;
(d) to submit proposals for the exploitation of natural, agricultural,
industrial, and other resources of all Contracting States in favor of the
inter-Arab military effort and joint defense;
(e) to organize the exchange of training missions between the
Contracting States for the preparation of plans, participation in military
exercises and maneuvers and the study of their results, recommendations
for the improvement of methods to ensure close cooperation in the field,
and for the general improvement of the forces of all the Contracting
states;
(f) to prepare the necessary data on the resources and military
potentialities of each of the Contracting States and the part to be played
by the forces of each in the joint military effort;
(g) to discuss the facilities and various contributions which each
of the Contracting States, in conformity with the provisions of this Treaty,
might be asked to provide, during a state of war, on behalf of the armies
of such other Contracting States as might be operating on its territory.

2.
The Permanent Military Commission may form temporary or
permanent subcommittees from among its own members to deal with any of the
matters falling within its jurisdiction. It may also seek the advice of
any experts whose views on certain questions are deemed necessary.

3.
The Permanent Military Commission shall submit detailed reports
on the results of its activities and studies to the Joint Defense Council
provided for in Article 6 of this Treaty, as well as an annual report
giving full particulars of its work and studies during the year.

4.
The Permanent Military Commission shall establish its head
quarters in Cairo but may hold meetings in any other place the Commission
may specify. The Commission shall elect its Chairman for two years; he
may be reelected. Candidates for the Chairmanship shall hold at least
the rank of a high commanding officer. Each member of the Commission
must have as his original nationality that of the Contracting State he
represents
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5.
In the event of war, the supreme command of the joint forces
shall be entrusted to the Contracting State possessing the largest military
force taking actual part in field operations, unless, by unanimous
agreement, the Commander-in-Chief shall be assisted in directing military
operations by a Joint Staff.

SUPPLEMENTARY PROTOCOL TO THE TREATY OF JOINT DEFENSE
AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN THE ARAB STATES
AND TO THE MILITARY ANNEX2

A consultative military organization shall be composed of the Chiefs
of Staff of the Contracting States to supervise the Permanent Military
Commission provided by Article 5 of the Treaty and to direct it in all
the functions specified in Article 1 of the Military Annex.
The reports and proposals of the Permanent Military Commission shall
be submitted to the Consultative Military Organization before submitting
them to the Joint Defense Council provided for by Article 6 of the Treaty.
The Consultative Military Organization shall submit its reports and
proposals regarding its functions to the Joint Defense Council that it
may examine them and take the necessary decisions.
The present Protocol shall have the same force as the Treaty and its
Appendix [Military Annex] as regards the provisions of Articles 5 and 6 of
the Treaty and Article 3 of the Military Appendix [Annex].

2
Signed on February 2, 1951 at the 13th session of the League
Council. Text from League of Arab States Treaty Series (no date, no
place of publication), p. 18, with change of "Common" to "Joint" in
Joint Defense; "Collaboration" to "Cooperation" in Economic Cooperation.
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